Approved For Release 2001/08/31: CIA-RDP78T02095R000500050001-9

CIA Order of Battle Conference July 1970

STATINTL

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11 Jun 70	to DCI memo re Proposed Conference	to Revise
2 → •	Estimates of Strengths of VC/NVA Forces	

Attachment: Helms to Lt. Gen. Donald Bennett, DIA, memo, dated 12 Jun 70, re Conference to Revise Estimates of Strengths of VC/NVA Forces

12 Jun 70

CIA Order of Battle Conference (time, purpose, participation, requirements, scope) LDX'd to pation, requirements, scope) LDX'd to pation, as guidance for outgoing cable to CINCPAC and MACV announcing the OB conference

STATINTL

15 Jun 70 Blind Memo re Revision of Intelligence Estimates of VC/NVA Forces

Attachments: Hand-written note re request from for info on estimates of enemy strengths in Cambodia/SVN border regions; VC recruiting in Cambodia; friendly troop disposition; latest supply losses

Blind Memo re VC/NVA Forces in Cambodia

Blind Memo, dated 8 Jun 70, re Communist Recruitment of Ethnic Cambodians

22 Jun 70 Lt. Gen. Bennett to DCI memo re Conference to Revise Estimates of Strength of VC/NVA Forces (agreeing to proposed conference)

DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File

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12 June 1970

CIA Order of Battle Conference

- Time and Location: The conference will convene no later than 15 July 1970 at CIA Head-quarters, Langley, Virginia. It will last for a period of 7-10 days.
- Purpose: The conference has been called by the Director of Central Intelligence who desires the participation of DIA and the field commands before publishing his revised estimates of the enemy forces in South Vietnam. The conference is directed specifically to do the following:
 - 1. Make revisions to existing order of battle estimates on the basis of the new unit identifications resulting from exploitation of the documentation acquired during the current Cambodian operations and other relevant data.
 - 2. Make any necessary changes in the strength figures assigned to units already listed in existing order of battle holdings.
 - 3. Examine implications of these revisions on aggregative order of battle estimates and make changes as required.
- III. Participation: The conference is intended as a meeting of working level order of battle specialists, principally from CIA, DIA, CINCPAC and MACV. Other organizations represented at the conference will participate in observer status.

Delegations to the conference should include at least three working level specialists to participate in panel sessions.

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IV. Requirements:

- Delegates should have SI clearance.
- Each delegation is expected to deposit with the conference the results of its exploitation of the relevant intelligence materials for consideration in panel sessions. This requirement is particularly important for MACV since it has more immediate and broader access to captured documents.
- V. Scope: As a general rule the conference will concern itself with those categories of enemy forces which are included in the military threat as shown in published CIA-DIA agreed estimates.

OER/CIA

MEMORANDUM FOR: The attached was LDX'd to DIAAP-4 as guidance for an outgoing cable to CINCPAC & MACV announcing the OB conference. STATINTL REPLACES FORM 10-101 FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-1 1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

Approved For Release 2001/08/31 ; CIA-RDP78T02095R000500050001-9

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 15 June 1970

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Revision of Intelligence Estimates of VC/NVA Forces

- 1. The current military operations in Cambodia have unearthed a large number of captured documents which provide detailed information on the organization and strength of the enemy forces operating in Cambodia and/or along the border areas of South Vietnam. The documents are proving to be particularly valuable because they are providing information on units and areas about which our previous knowledge was quite scant. Our examination of the new evidence indicates that revision of the current estimates is imperative and that these revisions may be substantial.
- 2. Preliminary analysis suggests that the current estimates understate the strength of the enemy's Regular forces (Main/Local Forces and Administrative Service Troops) by something on the order of 30,000 men. An adjustment of this magnitude would mean an increase of about 15 percent in the current estimate.
- 3. It is important to note, however, that the larger part of the correction will be for the Administrative Services category. A good part of the correction will reflect the identification of previously unknown units, or units whose existence was known but without any idea of their personnel strength. It appears that the community's estimates of combat forces have been very close to the mark but that we have been understating the manpower requirements needed to maintain and support the combat effort, particularly for those support forces located in Cambodia. The adjustments to be made to the estimates of combat forces will run less than 10,000.

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- The following examples provide some very preliminary approximations of some of the adjustments that seem to be in order. The estimate for COSVN military components will probably be increased by about 15,000. Some 1,500 of these are personnel in previously unidentified sapper battalions. Another 4,500 are the personnel of three newly identified regiments that are responsible for the support and movement of infiltrating personnel coming into the COSVN area and also the large flow of sick and wounded leaving the area. In the B-3 front -- to the north of the COSVN area -- the documents provide strengths, for the first time, of the four Binh Trams, or logistics stations, known to be located in Cambodia and extending southward from Laos along the South Vietnamese border. These four units total about 3,000 men. Although the documents verify the estimated unit structure for combat forces in the B-3 front area, they also seem to indicate that their aggregate strengths have been underestimated by some 3,000-4,000 men.
- 5. These estimates are, of course, highly important to an understanding of enemy capabilities and a considerable amount of detailed analysis is in order before revisions can be officially made. To facilitate this work, Mr. Helms had directed that a conference of order of battle specialists be convened no later than 15 July 1970. The conference will be chaired by CIA. DIA, CINCPAC and MACV have been invited to participate.
- 6. Finally, it is interesting to note that apart from the issue of estimates of military forces, the captured documents are providing a considerable amount of detailed information on the structure and strength of COSVN's political apparatus. This was formerly estimated at 2,500, but the newly captured documents put its personnel strength at about 8,000. This figure includes a regiment of security troops subordinate to the Security Section (police).

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Approved For Release 2001/08/31: CIA-RDF-78-102095R00050001-9 Rupply loss report a harmon 69 report (and map) of managent a strite in Cambodia. Report was from STATINTL STATINTL Weekly up-date by TLC on Troop dispositions attached memo by Rylander on recruitment. all items were more responsible to request. general Cushman

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Thomas

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Communist Recruitment of Ethnic Cambodians

Vietnamese Communist recruitment of ethnic Cambodians has apparently been extensive primarily in the southern and eastern parts of the country. It has played primarily upon prosihanous sentiments. However, the loyalties of the Cambodians are apparently superficial and often melt in combat. Some sources indicate that extensive indoctrination will be needed to fully incorporate the Cambodians into the Communist structure. Vietnamese Communists are probably also present in Khmer Rouge military units although the extent of Vietnamese control is unknown.

8 June 1970 OER/I/TLC


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
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


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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DDI-1646-70

Executive Registry

2 2 JUN 1970

S-2240/AP-4A

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT:

Conference to Revise Estimates of Strength of VC/NVA

Forces (U)

Reference: CIA memorandum, subject as above, dated 12 June 1970.

- 1. (S) I wholeheartedly agree that a VC/NVA order-of-battle conference should be held to exploit documentary information which has become available as a result of the Allied operations in Cambodia. In my view, the conference should not be convened until mid-July to allow the participants maximum time to review all relevant data.
- 2. (S) The field commands, MACV in particular, should play an invaluable role in the conference; to my knowledge MACV elements are the only ones which have had a good opportunity to review new data first hand. I have dispatched a message to CINCPAC/MACV advising of the conference objectives and emphasizing the necessity of their participation.
- 3. (S) If exploitation of currently available material is not sufficient to allow definitive conclusions, the conference should help to identify areas on which priority attention should be focused. The conference can also provide the opportunity to examine some of the side issues vital to over-all strength considerations, $\underline{e \cdot g \cdot}$, losses and attrition among southbound infiltration groups.
- 4. (U) My action officer for the conference is LTC Roy J. Herte, Jr., DIAAP-4A2 (Ext 53932).

D. V. BERNETE .

Lieutenant General, USA

Director

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1 JUN 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Proposed Conference to Revise Estimates

of Strengths of VC/NVA Forces

- 1. The current military operations in Cambodia have unearthed a large number of captured documents which provide information showing that current estimates understate the strength of VC/NVA forces by a considerable margin. The understatement results in large measure from the identification of units previously unknown to the community. Although most of these units are administrative service or support types, the new evidence also shows that the current estimates of combat forces are also understated.
- 2. On 8 June Saigon press sources reported that MACV was raising its estimates of enemy forces in III Corps and adjacent Cambodian sanctuaries from 55,000 to 91,000 troops. This report has obviously attracted a great deal of attention in official Washington, particularly in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and with Dr. Kissinger. CIA has already been asked to provide Acting Secretary Packard with a preliminary analysis of the revisions required in the current estimates.
- 3. DIA's position on the press reporting of MACV's changes was that the reports contained nothing new and that DIA has not increased the strength of the overall enemy threat estimate. I was asked to coordinate this position and refused on the grounds that the new evidence makes revisions of our estimates imperative and that these revisions may be substantial, in the order of 15-20 percent. I further informed DIA that this message would be loud and clear in our response to Mr. Packard.

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- 4. DIA's reaction has been to suggest that a revision of the estimates is now in order and that this could best be handled by CIA convening a conference of order of battle specialists from DIA, CINCPAC and MACV.
- The DIA suggestion seems to be a reasonable approach to revising our estimates. It would in the first instance be a further example of Agency initiative in resolution of national intelligence problems. Moreover, the community will have to face up to this question in very short order and the conference proposal has the not inconsiderable advantage of being done under our auspices rather than those of the VSSG Working Group. CIA sponsorship of the conference would also be of benefit to DIA in its relationships with the field commanders. Finally, I would note that the nature of the current problem and the marked improvement in our relations with MACV should mean that revised estimates could be achieved with much less of the wrangling and debate which characterized our conference in 1968.
- 6. For these reasons I recommend that CIA should agree to call the proposed conference. If you approve this recommendation, the attached memorandum to General Bennett, will initiate the proceedings.

25X1A

Deputy Director Economic Research

Attachment:
Memorandum to General Bennett

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1 2 JUN 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. General Donald V. Bennett

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Department of Defense

SUBJECT

: Conference to Revise Estimates of

Strengths of VC/NVA Forces

- 1. It has come to my attention that the large volume of documents being unearthed during the current operations in Cambodia provides convincing evidence that current estimates understate the strength of VC/NVA forces by a considerable margin. The recent airing of this issue in the press and the strong interest being expressed at the highest levels of this Government make it imperative that the question of revising our estimates be resolved as quickly as possible.
- 2. In my capacity as Director of Central Intelligence, I would prefer that our revisions of the current national estimates be made, if possible, with the participation of DIA as well as the field commands. To this end I plan to convene at CIA Headquarters a working level conference of order-of-battle specialists to begin no later than 15 July 1970. In addition to the participation of DIA, I would appreciate it if you would make the necessary arrangements for the participation of representatives from CINCPAC and MACV and such other organizations as you deem appropriate.

25X1A

3. will chair this conference. He can be reached on code 143, extension 5001.

/s/ Richard Helms
Richard Helms
Director

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Memorandum to Director, Defense Intelligence Agency from the Director (SUBJECT: Conference to Revise Estimates of Strengths of VC/NVA Forces)

CONCUR:		1 1 JUN 1970
	Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence	Date
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